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CHAPTER 5
MONITORING YIELDS OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS 
USING HYDRODYNAMIC METHODS
F K Lamb
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security 
and Departments of Physics and Astronomy 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
and
Center for International Security and Arms Control 
Stanford University
ABSTRACT
The yields of nuclear explosions can be estimated using hydrodynamic meth­
ods The approach that has been proposed by the Umted States for nuclear test 
ban monitoring makes use of the fact that the initial speed of the expanding 
shock wave produced by an underground explosion increases with the yield Sev­
eral techniques have been developed m the Umted States to measure the speed 
of the shock wave, of which the so-called CORRTEX technique is the most re­
cent and best A variety of algorithms have been used to derive yield estimates 
from shock wave radius vs time measurements Although more intrusive than 
seismic methods, current hydrodynamic methods could be used to momtor the 
Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion treaties, provided that ap­
propriate changes in these treaties are negotiated and that adequate cooperative 
arrangements are made to assure accuracy Significant engineering, operational, 
and analysis problems need to be solved before these methods could be used to 
momtor with confidence a low-threshold test ban The methods are not relevant 
to a comprehensive test ban
I INTRODUCTION
Hydrodynamic methods have long been used to estimate the yields of nu­
clear explosions, both in the atmosphere1 and underground 2 All such methods 
are based on the fact that the strength of the shock wave produced by an ex­
plosion increases with the yield Hydrodynamic methods were introduced as a 
treaty-momtonng tool m the Protocol of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 
(PNET) of 1976, which explicitly estabhshed such methods as among those that 
could be used to momtor the yield of any salvo of explosions with a planned 
aggregate yield greater than 150 kilotons (kt) 3 Hydrodynamic methods have re­
cently become a focus of attention as a result of controversy over monitoring of 
the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTB T)
©  American Institute of Physics
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The TTBT was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union m 1974 
and banned underground nuclear tests with yields greater than 150 kt after 
March 31, 1976 3 Although neither party has ratified the TTBT, both have 
separately stated that they will respect the 150 kt limit From that time to the 
present, the U S government has relied primarily on yield estimates based on 
teleseismic body wave magnitudes measured outside the Soviet Umon to mom- 
tor the TTBT limit 4 According to the U S Department of State, this method 
has an uncertainty of approximately a factor of two at the 95% confidence level 
for Soviet tests with yields near 150 kt 5 6 This statement means that 95 times 
out of 100 the estimated yield of a 150 kt explosion will he between 75 kt and 
300 kt Put another way, there is only one chance in 40 that a single explosion 
with a yield of 300 kt would appear to have a most hkely yield of 150 kt or less 
The probabihty that two such explosions would appear to be treaty compliant 
is 1 in 1600, and so on 7'According to recent studies, the best seismic methods 
now available are expected to have an uncertainty of a factor of 1 5-1 6 at the 
95% confidence level for explosions with yields above 50kt, if measurements are 
made only outside the Soviet Umon and the Soviet test site is not calibrated, or 
a factor of 1 3, once the Soviet test site is properly defined and calibrated 4 
Prior to the Reagan administration, the precision of remote seismic meth­
ods was considered adequate However, the Reagan administration has stated 
that “the remote seismic techniques we must rely on today to monitor Soviet nu­
clear tests do not provide yield estimates with the accuracy required for effective 
verification of compliance ” 5 As an alternative to these techniques, the Reagan 
administration has since 1983 strongly advocated routine use of hydrodynamic 
methods to monitor the TTBT 5 6 It beheves that it has identified in hydrody­
namic yield estimation methods an approach “which will reduce the uncertainty 
in yield measurement to an acceptable level and will do so without danger of 
compromising other sensitive information about the nature or performance of 
the nuclear device whose yield is to be measured ” 6
The present article reviews hydrodynamic yield estimation methods and 
their apphcation to test ban monitoring §11 provides a brief overview of the 
development of an underground nuclear explosion and the variety of yield es­
timation methods currently in use §111 summarizes some relevant material 
properties of rock and describes the evolution of the shock wave produced by 
an underground nuclear explosion In §IV we explain the technique advocated 
by the Reagan administration to measure the evolution of the shock wave In 
§V we describe the algorithms that are currently used to derive yield estimates 
from these measurements Technical issues related to the use of hydrodynamic 
methods to monitor test ban agreements are considered in §VI In §VII we briefly 
compare hydrodynamic and seismic yield estimation methods, discuss the cur­
rent status of U S -Soviet test ban negotiations, and mention several pubhc pol­
icy issues raised by the U S drive to gam Soviet acceptance of hydrodynamic 
methods for routine monitoring of the TTBT Our conclusions are summarized 
in §VIII
I l l
II MONITORING UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
Currently, about 90% of U S nuclear tests are conducted in vertical shafts at 
depths of 250-650 m, the remainder are conducted in tunnels 8 In preparing for a 
test that will be conducted deep underground, the vertical hole that will contain 
the nuclear charge (the so-called emplacement hole) is first drilled, a process 
that typically talces 8-10 weeks The charge and diagnostic equipment are then 
placed m canisters, which can be as much as 15 m in length, and lowered mto the 
emplacement hole Depending on the nature of the test, a variety of diagnostic 
pipes and cables may lead upward from the canisters to the surface (current U S 
nuclear weapon tests involve anywhere from ~50 to ~250 diagnostic pipes and 
cables) After the canisters are in place, the hole is stemmed with sand, gravel, 
and plugs 9
In the following two subsections we first describe what happens when a nu­
clear charge is exploded deep underground and then explain briefly the methods 
that are used to estimate the yields of such explosions
A Phases of an Underground Explosion
For present purposes the time development of the explosion may be divided 
mto the following three somewhat simplified phases 10 11
Initial phase— The release of nuclear energy is accompanied by emission 
of nuclear radiation, fission fragments, and thermal electromagnetic radiation 
The temperature m the nuclear charge nses steeply, reaching 107 K within a 
microsecond or so At the very earliest times, the energy of the explosion is 
earned outward by the expanding weapon debns and radiation Soon, however, 
the vaponzed nuclear charge and nearby rock form a bubble of hot gas in which 
the initial pressure is hundreds of Mbar The enormous pressure m the bubble 
causes it to expand rapidly, creating a cavity and dnving a shock wave mto the 
surrounding rock The final radius Rc of the cavity depends somewhat on the 
depth of the explosion and the composition of the surrounding rock, as well as 
the yield For a burst of yield W, a useful appproximate expression is12
•RcSsH CW /lkt)1/ 3 !!! (1)
The cavity reaches its final radius in about 90 (TV/1 kt)1/ 3 ms
Hydrodynamic phase— The shock wave initiated by the expansion of the 
hot gas propagates outward at a speed that is initially much greater than the 
speed of sound in the surrounding, undisturbed rock At this early time, the 
stress produced by the shock wave greatly exceeds the critical stress at which the 
rock becomes plastic, so that to a good approximation the rock can be treated 
as a fluid This phase is therefore referred to as the “hydrodynamic” phase 
(In defining the hydrodynamic phase, we emphasize the prefix hydro and simply 
require that the shocked rock behave hke a fluid Other authors emphasize 
instead the root dynamic and require not only that the shocked rock behave like 
a fluid, but also that the speed of the shock wave greatly exceed the speed of
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sound in the rock, this second usage is common in the Soviet Umon ) As the 
shock wave continues to expand, it weakens Eventually, the strength of the rock 
can no longer be neglected This marks the end of the hydrodynamic phase
Final phase — Even after the compression wave is no longer hydrodynamic, 
the ranfaction wave that follows is still strong enough to fracture rock Intense 
fracturing typically occurs out to a radius ~ 3Rc 12 Beyond this pomt, the degree 
of fracturing caused by the expanding shock wave drops dramatically until, at 
~ 5 RCi fracturing essentially stops (Ranfaction waves caused by reflection of 
the shock wave from the surface or collapse of the roof of the cavity may cause 
fractunng beyond this radius ) The shock wave then continues to expand nearly 
elastically, eventually evolving into the leading wave of a tram of elastic (seismic) 
waves These waves, which typically carry <  5% of the energy of the explosion, 
propagate through and around the earth and can be observed at points thousands 
of kilometers from the site of the explosion
B Monitoring Methods
Three different types of methods are commonly used to estimate the yields 
of nuclear weapon tests These types make use of phenomena that occur dining 
the three phases of the explosion identified above
Radiochemical methods make use of the nuclear reactions that occur during 
the first phase of the explosion By knowing the relative abundances of various 
nuchdes m the original nuclear device and by determining the relative abun­
dances of fission fragments and fusion products after the explosion, the yield of 
the explosion can be estimated However, at present there are several barriers to 
using radiochemical methods to momtor test ban treaties First, the monitoring 
party must be able to make a variety of measurements at the test site Second, 
to achieve high precision with this method some knowledge of the design of the 
nuclear charge may be reqmred Third, in addition to the yield, radiochemical 
methods can provide other information about the design and performance of 
nuclear devices, which may be considered sensitive For these reasons, radio­
chemical methods are not usually considered for treaty monitoring 13
Hydrodynamic methods make use of the fact that the strength of the shock 
wave produced by an explosion increases with the yield, other things being equal 
As a result, the peak particle velocity, pressure, and density are greater at a 
given radius for explosions of greater yield By comparing measurements of these 
quantities with a model of the evolution of the shock wave based on knowledge of 
the natine and structure of the geologic media in which the explosion occured, 
the yield of the explosion can be estimated In order to use hydrodynamic 
methods to monitor test ban treaties, the monitoring party must have access to 
the test site m order to determine the relevant properties of the geologic media 
there before the test and to measure the evolution of the shock wave during the 
test To assure high accuracy, constraints on the test geometry are also required 
Hydrodynamic methods are not part of current TTBT verification provisions
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Seismic methods malee use of the ground motions caused by the elastic 
waves that propagate through and around the earth during the third stage of 
an underground nuclear explosion Some seismic waves (such as body and sur­
face waves) propagate to so-called teleseismic distances (>2,000 km) from the 
explosion Yield estimation methods based on these waves can be used with 
measurements of ground motion made at stations outside the country m which 
the test occurs Other seismic waves (such as Lg waves) typically propagate only 
to regional distances (<2,000 km) Yield estimation methods based on these lat­
ter waves may require data from m-country stations To assure high accuracy, 
knowledge of the geologic media at the test site and the way m which the earth 
near the site transmits seismic waves is required As noted earlier, the United 
States routinely uses seismic data taken at stations outside the Soviet Union 
to momtor the TTBT In-country monitoring stations and independent access 
to data on the seismic properties of the test site are not part of the current 
verification provisions of the TTBT For recent reviews of seismic methods, see 
refs 4 and 14^18
It has been claimed several times in recent Congressional hearings on TTBT 
and PNET verification19“ 23 that hydrodynamic methods are “direct” whereas 
seismic methods are not From a scientific point of view there is no such distinc­
tion All three methods just described involve (1) production of a signal by the 
exploding charge, (2) propagation of the signal to locations more or less remote 
from the detonation point, and (3) detection of the signal by sensors at those 
locations Important questions are how the size of the signal vanes with yield, 
how well the propagation of the signal is understood, and how accurately and 
precisely the sensors can measure the signal
It has also been asserted22 that use of hydrodynamic methods m and of itself 
eliminates the possibility of systematic error or “bias” Obviously it does not 
All three methods are subject to both systematic and random errors Relevant 
questions are the expected sizes of the errors, and whether they are so large as 
to be of concern
III SHOCK WAVE EVOLUTION
In hydrodynamic methods of yield estimation, the size of the explosion is 
estimated by fitting a model of the evolution of the shock wave, which depends 
parametrically on the yield, to measurements of the motion Shock waves m 
rock behave differently from shock waves in air primarily because the atoms in 
rock are close together and interact strongly 24 Therefore, in discussing the ap­
plication of hydrodynamic methods to underground explosions it will be helpful 
to have in mind some relevant material properties of rock as well how shock 
waves produced by underground explosions evolve m rock
A Rock Properties
The strength of a shock wave can be characterized by the peak pressure 
that it produces Weak shock waves and acoustic waves in rock propagate at a
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constant speed, the so-called elastic wave speed25
Here Ko and Go are the bulk and shear moduhi, respectively, of the rock in 
its standard state, and po is the mass density For granite, Ko ~  360kbar and 
Go «  320kbar,26 giving c¿ «  5km s-1
Shock waves that are strong enough to produce stresses m excess of the 
critical shear stress pçnt cause the rock to lose its firmness and to become plastic 
(for granite, pcnt is about 40kbar for high strain rates26) Such waves are called 
plastic waves The speed of a plastic wave increases with its strength The 
weakest such waves propagate at the low-pressure plastic wave speed25
which is determined by the compressibility of the rock m its standard state 
Since only the bulk modulus contributes to Co, it is necessarily less than c¿ For 
solid grämte, cq «  4km s” 1
In the hydrodynamic regime, conservation of mass, momentum, and energy 
across the shock front imply27
<P, V) -to(po,Va) =  \ (po +  p) (Vo -  V ) ,  (4)
where eo and e, po and p, and Vq and V  are, respectively, the internal energies, 
pressures, and specific volumes ahead of and just behind the shock front By 
analogy with the equation relating the initial and final pressures and volumes 
during adiabatic compression of a fluid, this relation, which is of the form
p =  H(V,po,Vo), (5)
is called the shock adtabai or Hugomoi
Conservation of momentum across the front of a hydrodynamic shock wave 
imphes
P =  Po +  poDu , (6)
where D is the speed of the shock front, measured in the rest frame of the 
undisturbed rock, u is the particle speed just behind the shock front, and we 
have assumed that the rock in front of the shock front is at rest Thus, the 
Hugomot may be expressed as a relation between D and u, that is
D =  H(u) (7)
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Particle speed (km s 9
Fig 1 — Relation between shock wave speed D and particle speed u just behind 
the shock front for granite (ref 29) Note the approximate linearity of the Hugomot at 
large u The step m the curve at u «  2k m s“ 1 reflects a phase transition that occurs at 
about 400kbar
Figure 1 shows a recent Hugomot for grämte expressed m this way In general, 
the Hugomot depends on the chemical composition, porosity, gas-filled porosity, 
fracture pattern, degree of liquid saturation, and other properties of the rock 
For some rocks, the Hugomot may be adequately represented m the hydro 
dynamic regime by a single linear relation of the form27 28
D =  A +  B u ,
which imphes the Hugomot curve27
(8)
A2(V0 -  V)
(¿J _ i)*y* [ ^ j  -  $
(9)
Table 1 lists values of A , B, and po for grämte and wet tuff that were derived 
by fitting a Hugomot of the form (9) to recent high-pressure equations of state 
for these materials
For Hugomots of the form (9), the ratio p/po of the material density imme 
diately behind the shock front to the material density ahead of the shock front 
increases with the strength of the shock wave until it reaches a certain value 
(p/po)max =  (Vb/V^max =  B / (B — 1) Once the wave has become this strong,
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TABLE 1
Rock Equations of State®
Rock Po (g cm 3) A (kms *) B Rt 1 (m) Rt iso (m)
Grämte 2 67 2 80 145 38 20
Wet tuff 1 95 145 162 70 37
°The parameters ¿>0 , A , and B  are from ref 30 and were obtained by fitting a Mie- 
Gruneisen equation of state to recent tabulated equations of state for granite (ref 29) 
and wet tuff (ref 31) at high pressures Rt 1 and Rt 150 are characteristic shock wave 
transition radii (see text) for 1 kt and 150 kt explosions
any further increase m its strength does not produce any increase in the ratio 
p/po For this reason, the density ratio (/c>//>o)max is referred to as the limiting 
density ratio For the granite Hugomot hsted m Table 1, the hunting density 
ratio is ~3  Peak pressures ~  10-100 Mbar are required to achieve density ratios 
near the limiting value
If a single linear relation adequately describes the Hugomot at large u and if 
this relation could be extrapolated to small u, the constant A would correspond 
to the low-pressure plastic wave speed c0 However, the large-u relation usually 
is not valid for small u, and hence A usually does not equal cq In grämte, for 
example, A is about 3 km s-1 whereas cq is about 4 km s-1
Even if the Hugomot is not linear over the range of u that is of interest, 
a curve consisting of piece-wise linear segments of the form (8) may serve as a 
practical approximation to H(u) for many purposes 28
B Simplified Model
To understand the evolution of shock waves producéd by underground nu­
clear tests, it is helpful to consider first the shock wave that would be produced 
by release of a large amount of energy m an infinitesimal spherical volume (a 
so-called point explosion) in homogeneous rock A qualitative understanding of 
the development of the shock wave produced by such an explosion can be gamed 
from the following relatively simple model Suppose we make the ansatz that 
throughout the motion the particle speed u just behind the shock front is related 
to the yield W  of the explosion by the expression30 32
where R is the radius of the shock front and ƒ is a constant dimensionless fac 
tor that describes how the energy of the explosion is partitioned between kinetic 
energy of bulk motion and internal energy, and how the velocity, density, and in­
ternal energy of the shocked material vary with position The factor ƒ is constant 
for a self-similar shock wave (see below) but is not expected to remain constant
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as the shock wave evolves 32 Nevertheless, shock wave radius and particle speed 
data from actual underground nuclear tests as well as computer simulations of 
such tests indicate that relation (10) with ƒ «  0 5 is satisfied fairly well for 
grämte and wet tuff until relatively late times 30 32
Let us now assume, for the sake of illustration, that the Hugomot of the 
medium can be adequately represented by a single linear relation of the form (8) 
over the whole range of u that is of interest Then cq =  A Therefore, m the 
following discussion we refer to A as the low-pressure plastic wave speed 
Given the ansatz (10), the Hugomot can be rewritten as32
D =  ^  =  A + Bu =  A
ctt +  1 5 (11)
where
is the characteristic transition radius that separates the region where D  oc R~3/2 
from the region where D  »  A Typical values of Rt for 1 kt and 150 kt explosions 
in grämte and wet tuff are hsted m Table 1 for the values of A and B given there 
In dry alluvium, Rt can sometimes exceed 60 m for a 150 kt explosion
Equation (11) can be integrated to obtain a simple, closed expression for 
i2(t), from which one can calculate -D(f), u(t), p(t), and p(t) 32 33 This model 
shows m a qualitative way how the evolution of the shock wave depends on the 
yield of the explosion and the equation of state of the rock As an example, the 
peak pressure, peak density, and radius of the shock front at various times are 
hsted in Table 2, for 1 kt and 150 kt explosions m grämte The pressure po of 
the overburden is ~200 bar for a depth of 1 km and hence can be neglected for 
all depths and times of interest
The motion of the shock front given by equation (11) can be divided into 
three different intervals
Strong Shock Interval — Initially, the speed of the shock front is much greater 
than the speed of sound m the undisturbed rock, the pressure behind the shock 
front is predominantly thermal pressure, and the ratio of the density immedi 
ately behind the shock front to the density ahead of the front is close to its 
limiting value This is the strong shock interval 24
For a sphencally-symmetnc point explosion in a homogeneous medium, the 
motion of the shock wave m the strong shock interval is self-similar 34-36 In such 
a motion, the distributions with radius of the pressure, density, and particle 
velocity evolve with time in such a way that only their scales and the radius of 
the shock front change, while the shapes of the distributions remain unaltered 
The evolution of such a shock wave is only weakly dependent on the properties 
of the medium Thus, simple models can be used to estimate the yield if there 
is an interval of self-similar motion and if data from this interval are available
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TABLE 2
Shock Wave Evolution m Granite®
Pressure
(kbar)
Density
(/>max)
lk t Explosion 
Time (/¿s) Radius (m)
150 kt Explosion 
Time (/¿s) Radius (m)
70,000 09 4 0 5 20 3
10,000 08 10 09 80 5
4,000 0 7 40 14 200 8
1,500 06 90 2 500 11
500 05 200 3 1,200 17
150 04 600 5 3,000 30
“For the model of a sphencally-symmetric, point explosion described m the text The 
Hugoniot (8) was used, with the values of A and B given m Table 1 The phase 
transition that occurs at ~400kbar (cf Fig 1) has been neglected The unit of 
density, is the limiting density of granite (see text), which is 9 4 g c m ~ 3 for this
equation of state
For example, in the evolution given by equation (11), the motion of the 
shock front radius R during the strong shock interval (R  <C Rt) satisfies
Thus, the exponent of time is mdependent of the properties of the medium 
Moreover, the evolution is only affected by po and B
Unfortunately, in actual underground nuclear tests self-similar motion does 
not have time to develop, given current testmg practices and the yields of inter 
est, as explained below
Transition Interval— As the shock wave expands, it weakens and slows, 
and the peak pressure and density drop When the shock front reaches a certain 
radius R\, the peak density ratio is 0 8 times the limiting value and we say that 
the shock wave has entered the transition interval (The motion of the shock 
wave changes only gradually and so the point at which it is said to enter the 
transition interval is purely conventional Throughout the present article we use 
the convention that the transition interval begins when the peak density ratio 
fails to 80% of its limiting value ) For an explosion in grämte, this occurs when 
the peak pressure has fallen to ~  10,000 kbar (cf Table 2) For a 1 kt explosion 
in grämte Ri is ~ lm , whereas for a 150 kt explosion R\ is ~5m
Over most of the transition interval, the thermal pressure just behmd the 
shock front is not much greater than the cold pressure of the compressed rock, 
although the speed D of the shock front is still much larger than the low pressure
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plastic wave speed A In this interval, the motion of the shock wave is more 
sensitive to the properties of the medium than it is in the strong shock interval, 
depending on A as well as B and po even m the simple model of equation (11) 
Consequently, more knowledge of the ambient rock is reqmred m order to make 
accurate yield estimates using data taken m this interval
Plastic Wave Interval— As the shock wave expands and weakens further, 
the thermal pressure behind the shock front becomes a small fraction of the total 
pressure and the shock speed D approaches the low-pressure plastic wave speed 
A At a certain radius R2 (~Rt), the shock speed is 1 2 times the low-pressure 
plastic wave speed and we say that the shock wave has entered the plastic wave 
interval (Again, the motion of the shock wave changes only gradually and so the 
point at which it is said to enter the plastic wave interval is purely conventional 
Throughout the present article we use the convention that the plastic wave 
interval begins when the shock speed falls to 1 2 times the low-pressure plastic 
wave speed ) For an explosion m granite, this occurs when the peak pressure 
has fallen to ~150kbar, corresponding to a peak density ratio ~0 4 times the 
maximum (cf Table 2) For a 1 kt explosion m granite R2 is ~5 m, whereas for 
a 150 kt explosion R2 is ~30m
For the model given by equation (11), the plastic wave interval corresponds 
to R >  3 Rt In this regime
R «  const +  A t , (14)
where the constant is determined by the motion in the strong shock and transi­
tion intervals
The evolution of the shock wave m the plastic wave interval is sensitive to 
the equation of state and the constitutive relations describing the rock For ac 
tual rocks, the evolution in this interval is complex, as described below Hence 
relatively detailed modehng is reqmred m order to obtain accurate yield esti­
mates from data taken in this interval
C Other Effects
The evolution of the shock wave produced by an actual underground nu­
clear test is more complex than the evolution just described, for several reasons 
First, the actual shock wave is not produced by a sphencally-symmetnc point 
explosion The emplacement holes currently used m U S  tests have radii Re 
as large as 1 5 m10 and emplacement holes with larger radii are planned for the 
future Moreover, the nuclear charge and diagnostic canisters may be many me­
ters m length As a result, the source of the shock wave is vapor and radiation 
filling a volume with a dimension of meters Moreover, the explosion is usually 
not spherically symmetric, causing the expanding shock wave to be asphencal 
initially The energy flows produced by explosions in tunnels may be even more 
complex
The motion of the shock wave cannot become self-similar until the shock 
wave has enveloped a mass of material much greater than the mass of the nu­
clear charge and casing, and energy transport by radiation is negligible The
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radius Rq at which this occurs is necessarily much greater than the radius Re 
of the emplacement hole and depends on the design of the nuclear charge and 
surrounding diagnostic equipment Unless there is a range of radii satisfying 
Rq <C R *C Ri , the shock wave will not have time to become self-similar be­
fore entering the transition interval The data in Table 2 show that no such 
range exists in granite for current emplacement practices, even for explosions 
as large as 150 kt Thus, the simplicity of estimating yields from an interval of 
self-similar motion cannot be realized, given current testing practices and the 
yields of interest
Other complications anse from the complexity of the motion in the transi­
tion and plastic wave intervals in actual rocks As the shock wave expands and 
weakens, one or more phase transitions may occur We have already noted that 
grämte undergoes a phase transition when the peale pressure falls to ~ 4 0 0  kbar 
At a somewhat lower peak pressure (~ 200 kbar in grämte), the shock speed be­
comes less than the elastic wave speed q  At this point the shock wave sphts 
into an elastic wave followed by a plastic wave 25 37 The initial pressure jump in 
the elastic wave is pcnt, which is «  40 kbar for grämte 26 Smce cq <  q , the weak­
ening plastic wave cannot overtake the elastic wave and the two-wave structure 
is stable As a result, the plastic wave propagates through rock that has already 
been compressed and accelerated to a velocity ~ 1 -1 0 m s” 1 by the elastic wave 
(Smce Co is several km s“ 1, for most purposes the acceleration of the medium 
by the elastic wave may be neglected and the plastic wave may be taken to 
propagate with a speed Co relative to the undisturbed ambient medium, as was 
done m eq [6]) Finally, when the peak pressure in the plastic wave is no longer 
much greater than the critical shear stress pcnt, the shear strength of the rock 
can no longer be neglected In grämte, for example, pcnt is «  40 kbar, and the 
hydrodynamic approximation therefore begins to fail when the peak pressure 
falls below ~ 1 5 0  kbar
In addition to these complications that occur in a homogeneous medium, 
theoretical models and experimental data show that the evolution of shock waves 
in actual geologic media can be affected by voids, layering, and other geologic 
structures that may vary from one test site to another
IV MEASURING SHOCK WAVE EVOLUTION
A variety of sensors have been used at different times in the Umted States to 
measure the evolution of shock waves produced by underground nuclear explo­
sions These include strain gauges, particle velocity gauges, accelerometers, and 
pressure sensors 26 In the Umted States, recent efforts to develop instrumenta­
tion for test ban monitoring have focused on radius vs time (RVT) techniques, 
which measure the radius of the shock front as a function of time
A Using Sensing Cables
One RVT measuring technique that has been used in the Umted States 
smce the early 1960s is based on the fact that the pressure peak near the front
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Fig 2 — Schematic drawings illustrating (a) placement of the shock front sensing 
cable in a satellite hole and (b) progressive shortening of the cable by the expanding 
shock wave produced by a nuclear explosion
of the shock wave can crush an electrical cable In this approach, a coaxial 
sensing cable is lowered into the emplacement hole before it is backfilled or into 
one or more other holes (so-called satellite holes) that have been drilled nearby 
specifically for this purpose The satellite-hole geometry is shown m Figure 2a If 
the sensing cable is strong enough that it is not crushed by the elastic precursor 
or other unwanted signals but weak enough that it ts crushed by the pressure 
peak m the hydrodynamic shock wave, the cable will be electrically shorted or 
its impedance substantially changed near the point where the hydrodynamic 
shock front intersects it As the shock wave expands with time, the length of 
cable from the measuring equipment to the shallowest point at which it has been 
crushed is measured by electrical equipment attached to the cable and located 
above ground, as shown m Figure 2b If the time at which the explosion began 
and the path of the cable relative to the center of the explosion are known and if 
the explosion is spherically symmetric, the radius of the shock front as a function 
of the time since the beginning of the explosion can be calculated from a record 
of the changing length of the cable
As a concrete example, suppose the sensing cable is placed m a vertical 
satellite hole displaced laterally a distance d from the emplacement point Then 
if the length Lq of the sensing cable from the surface to the point where the cable
a l
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Fig 3 — Schematic drawing illustrating how the radius R of the shock wave at 
time t is related to the lateral displacement a of the sensing cable from the center of the 
explosion, the length Lo of the sensing cable from the surface to the point where the 
cable is first crushed, and the length L of the cable
is first crushed is known, measurements of L(t) can be converted into estimates 
of the radius R of the shock front as a function of time t using the Pythagorean 
relation
m  =
* f
<P +  ( l 0 -  L(t)J
11/2
(15)
The geometrical meaning of the quantities appearing m equation (15) is shown 
in Figure 3 In practice the sensing cable usually is not perfectly vertical and 
more comphcated calculations must be performed to convert L(t) to R(t)
As discussed m §V, an error of 1 m in the measured distance of the crushing 
point from the center of the explosion will cause an error of about 50 kt in the 
yield estimate, for yields near 150 kt Thus, accurate surveys of the emplacement 
and satellite holes and an accurate knowledge of the path of the sensing cable 
within the satelhte hole are required in order to make an accurate yield estimate 
If the cable wanders within the hole and this is not taken into account, the length 
of the cable crushed by the shock wave will be greater than the linear distance 
traveled by the shock front, causing the the speed of the shock wave and therefore 
the yield of the explosion to be overestimated In the Umted States, hole surveys 
are currently made with special laser or gyroscopic equipment In some yield
t
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estimation algorithms, the lateral displacement of the satellite hole from the 
center of the explosion can be treated as one of the unknowns m estimating the 
yield
If the explosion is not spherically symmetric, due to the effect of the canister, 
the design of the test geometry, or inhomogeneities in the ambient medium, 
interpretation of the sensing cable data becomes more comphcated and could be 
ambiguous or misleading under the conditions likely to be encountered m treaty 
monitoring Potential problems of this kind could be addressed by cooperative 
agreements, as discussed m §VI
Sensing cables with a variety of crushing strengths, ranging from as httle as 
30 bar to as much as 30 kbar, have been used 38 However, even the latter cable 
can be crushed by the elastic precursor m grämte Thus, once the shock wave 
has split, the length of cable to the crushing point may reflect the position of 
the elastic shock front rather than that of the hydrodynamic shock front which 
follows 39 40 If so, the sensing cable cannot provide data about the motion of the 
hydrodynamic shock wave 26 Worse, if the motion is misinterpreted as that of 
the hydrodynamic wave, the estimated yield of the explosion will be erroneously 
high As a result, interpretation of data m this interval requires great care
The Reagan administration has strongly advocated adoption of the satel­
lite-hole geometry for monitoring the TTBT using hydrodynamic methods In 
order to collect ground shock data m the hydrodynamic region from explosions 
with yields near 150 kt, the satellite hole must be shghtly deeper than the em­
placement hole, which is typically ~650 m deep for such explosions, and the 
deepest portion of the satellite hole must be no further than ~30 m from the 
center of the explosion In order to use the particular hydrodynamic yield esti­
mation algorithm advocated by the administration (insensitive-interval scaling, 
see §V), the sensing cable must cover the algorithmic interval, which is a more 
demanding criterion and requires that the bottom of the satellite hole be no 
more than ~10m  from the center of the explosion, for yields near 150 kt
In order to apply hydrodynamic methods to monitoring a 10 kt low-thresh­
old test ban, the bottom  of the satellite hole would have to be well within ~10 m 
of the emplacement point, which is typically ~250 m deep for charges with yields 
near 10 kt In order to apply insensitive interval scaling, the satellite hole would 
have to be within ~4 m of the center of the explosion
Use of the satellite hole geometry requires sophisticated drilling capabilities 
in order to make sure that the satellite hole maintains the proper separation 
from the emplacement hole 41 In addition, conversion of cable length to shock 
wave radius is more comphcated if the cable is m a satellite hole than if it is in 
the emplacement hole On the other hand, the satellite-hole geometry reduces 
the mtrusiveness of the method and eliminates the disturbing effects of jetting 
within diagnostic pipes and other phenomena that can crush or short the sensing 
cable ahead of the hydrodynamic ground shock In the discussion that follows, 
we shall assume that the sensing cable is in a satelhte hole, unless otherwise 
stated 4
124
B Measuring the Position of the Crushing Point
During the 1960s and 1970s, the position of the crushing point was measured 
m the Umted States using a technique called SLIFER (which is an acronym for 
Shorted Location Indicator by Frequency of Electrical Resonance) 26 42 In this 
approach, the cable is used as the inductive element of a resonant oscillator 
As the cable is progressively crushed, the frequency of the oscillator changes 
By knowing the propagation velocity of electromagnetic signals m the cable and 
the frequencies of the oscillator that correspond to L =  0 and L =  Lo, one can 
convert measurements of the change in oscillator frequency during the explosion 
to estimates of the change in the length of the cable
In the late 1970s, an improved approach to measuring the length of sensing 
cables, called CORRTEX, was developed (CORRTEX is an acronym for Con 
tinuous Reflectometry for Radius versus Time Experiments) 39 40 43 44 In this 
approach, a sequence of electrical pulses is sent down the cable At the crushing 
point, these pulses are reflected back up the cable to recording equipment By 
knowing the speed at which the pulses propagate down and up the cable, the 
round tnp travel time of each pulse can be converted into an estimate of the 
length of the cable at the time the pulse was reflected
Current (CORRTEX III) equipment can store up to 4,000 data points 
Pulse separations from 10 //s to 90 fis  can be selected, giving a record of the 
changing cable length that is 40 ms to 360 ms m length The pulses typically 
propagate down and up the sensing cable at about 2 x 105 km s-1 A typical 
uncertainty m the round-tnp travel time during a nuclear explosion is 500 ps, 
corresponding to an uncertainty of about 10 cm in the measured length of the 
cable or about 5 cm m the distance to the crushing point The cable length 
measurements can be checked by creating fiducial loops in the cable at prede­
termined pomts, which will create downward jumps in the cable length as the 
crushing point passes over them Using these jumps, the cable length data can 
be adjusted for systematic errors The time at which the explosion begins is 
estimated by recording the time at which the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) from 
the explosion arrives at the CORRTEX recorder The CORRTEX technique 
is less affected by disturbing signals produced by the explosion than were ear 
her techniques and is the technique that has been advocated by the Reagan 
administration for monitoring the TTBT
RVT techmques are also used to estimate the yields of underground nuclear 
tests in the Soviet Umon The Soviets use two different sensmg techmques, 
called Mis (or Miz) and Contactor 45 46 The current Soviet approach reportedly 
uses a sensmg system with switches that are sequentially destroyed by the shock 
front 47
V  YIELD ESTIMATION ALGORITHMS
Once measurements of the length of the sensmg cable have been converted 
to estimates of the radius of the shock front as a function of time, the yield
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of the explosion is estimated by applying some algorithm, by which we mean a 
particular procedure for comparing the RVT data with a particular model of the 
motion of the shock front Because hydrodynamic methods of yield estimation 
are evolving as research aimed at increasing our understanding of underground 
explosions and improving yield estimation methods continues, the description of 
yield estimation algorithms m the present section is necessarily a status report
Although the algorithms used by different individuals or groups can (and 
usually do) differ in detail, most of the algorithms currently m use are of four 
basic types insensitive interval scaling, similar explosion scaling, semi-analytical 
modeling, and numerical modeling These are the algorithms that are discussed 
here In order to simplify matters, we will assume at first that the explosion is 
spherically symmetric and that the ambient geologic medium is homogeneous 
Some of the comphcations that can anse if the explosion is asphencal or the 
medium is inhomogeneous are descnbed at the end of this section
A Insensitive Interval Scaling
The simplest algonthm currently in use is insensitive interval scaling This 
is the algonthm that the Reagan administration has proposed to use m analyzing 
CORRTEX data as a new routine method of momtonng Soviet compliance with 
the TTBT
Insensitive interval scaling assumes that the radius of the shock wave pro­
duced by an explosion of given yield does not depend on the rock in which the 
explosion occurs dunng a certain interval m time and radius called the “insensi­
tive interval” This assumption is based on empirical evidence that the radius of 
the shock front u  relatively insensitive to the medium during a certain interval 
in time and radius toward the end of the transition interval, for the particular 
geologic media for which the Umted States has good experimental data or the­
oretical models These media include the dry alluvium, partially saturated tuff, 
saturated tuff, grämte, basalt, and rhyohte at the nuclear test sites the U S 
has used These media are mostly sihcates and almost all are located at the 
Nevada Test Site The radius of the shock front appears to depend only weakly 
on the medium despite the fact that phase transitions and shock wave sphtting 
occur in some of these media during the insensitive interval The radius of the 
shock front in one medium approaches and then deviates from that m another 
gradually, so that the insensitive interval is not sharply defined
Although the reason for the existence of an insensitive interval for this 
collection of media is currently not well understood from a fundamental physical 
point of view, it appears to stem from a particular correlation among the relevant 
properties of these media It known that the relevant properties of other 
geologic media are not correlated m this way, so that the radius of the shock 
front m these media during the “insensitive interval” is very different from the 
radius of the shock front in the sihcates cited above Thus, the existence of an 
insensitive interval must be established by test experience or modeling, and is 
only assured for certain geologic media
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In using insensitive interval scaling, the shock wave sensing cable must be 
placed close enough to the center of the explosion that it samples the insensitive 
interval Yield estimates are then derived by fitting a simple empirical formula, 
called the Los Alamos Formula, to the RVT data in this interval48 If the radius 
R of the shock front is expressed m meters, this formula is
R(t) =  a W 1^ (t/W 1^ )b, (16)
where W  is the yield of the explosion in kilotons, t is the elapsed time since the 
beginning of the explosion m milliseconds, and a and b axe constants According 
to the assumption on which the algorithm is based, the values of a and b do not 
depend on the medium (because of this, eq [16] has sometimes been referred to 
as the Los Alamos “universal formula” ) The values of the constants a and 6 
are typically determined by fitting equation (16) to a selected interval of RVT 
data from a collection of nuclear explosions Diiferent individuals and groups 
have found different values of a and b at various times Even the values used by 
a single group have changed with time by amounts that have caused estimated 
yields to change by tens of percent The values of a and b used here are 6 29 
and 0 475 48
The Los Alamos Formula is a simple power law that approximates the actual 
RVT curve during the insensitive interval This is illustrated m Figure 4, which 
compares the Formula with a model of the evolution of the shock wave produced 
in grämte by a sphencally-symmetnc point explosion with a yield of 62 kt In 
practice, the Los Alamos Formula is usually first fit to a broad interval of radius 
vs time data that is thought to mclude the insensitive interval The result is a 
sequence of yield estimates Due to the departure of the Formula from the actual 
RVT curve at both early and late times, the sequence of yield estimates typically 
forms a U-shaped curve This is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows the sequence 
of yield estimates obtained by applying the Formula to the relatively high-quality 
SLIFER data from the Ptledrtver explosion in grämte (yield estimation using 
CORRTEX data cannot be illustrated here because at present all CORRTEX 
data remain classified) If the assumptions on which the algorithm is based are 
satisfied, the yield estimates near the bottom  of the curve should approximate 
the actual yield of the explosion
In the usual form of the algorithm, only the RVT data that fall within a 
certain predetermined interval chosen on the basis of previous experience (the so- 
called algorithmic interval) are actually used to make the final yield estimate 
Because both the location and the extent of the algorithmic interval depend 
on the yield W  of the explosion (both are proportional to IV1/ 3), an iterative 
procedure must be followed in estimating the yield of an explosion whose yield 
is initially unknown Table 3 hsts the algorithmic interval for several yields
The sensitivity of an individual yield estimate to an error in the inferred 
location of the shock front depends on the position of the data point within the 
algorithmic interval and the yield of the explosion For example, the sensitivity
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Time (ms)
Fig 4 — Comparison of the Los Alamos Formula with a model of the evolution of a 
shock wave in granite produced by a spherically-symmetric point explosion with a yield 
of 62 kt, showing the agreement during the transition interval and the departure of the 
Formula from the model at earlier and later times The effect of the phase transition at 
400 kbar has been included m the model
vanes from 13 kt m "1 at the beginning of the interval to 7 4kt m“ 1 at the end of 
the interval, for a 10 kt explosion, and from 77 kt m“ 1 to 18 kt m-1 , for a 150 kt 
explosion
The algonthmic interval for a yield of 62 kt is indicated in Figure 5 by the 
two vertical bars at the bottom  of the figure In this example the assumptions on 
which the algonthm is based appear to be satisfied and the average of the yield 
estimates that he within the algonthmic interval is very close to the announced 
yield of 62 kt
The insensitive interval algonthm does not work as well if the assumptions 
on which it is based are not satisfied This is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows 
the yield estimates obtained by fitting the Los Alamos Formula to good quality 
SLIFER data from a typical low yield explosion m alluvium In this example 
the RVT data have been scaled in the manner descnbed below in the subsection 
on similar explosion scaling, so that the denved yield should be 1 kt (the actual 
yield is classified) The yield estimates given by the Los Alamos Formula are 
systematically low, ranging from 30% to 82% of the actual yield, and do not 
form a U-shaped curve The average of the yield estimates that he within the 
algonthmic interval is about 60% of the actual yield The overall appearance 
of the yield vs time curve shows that the assumptions of the algonthm are not 
satisfied
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Fig 5 — Yîeld estimates derived by applying the Los Alamos Formula to SLIFEE 
data from the Pilednver explosion in granite, which had a nominal yield of 62 kt The 
so-called algorithmic time interval is the interval between the two vertical bars The 
average of the yield estimates within the algorithmic interval is in good agreement with 
the nominal yield Note the departure of the yield estimates from 50-70 kt at earlier 
and later times, which is caused by the deviation of the Formula from the actual radius 
vs time behavior of the shock wave outside the algorithmic interval (cf Fig 4)
TABLE 3
Algorithmic Intervals“
Yield (kt) Time Interval (ms) Radius Interval (m)
1 0 10 —  05 21 —  4 5
10 0 21 —  1 1 45  —  9 7
50 0 37 — 1 8 7 7 — 17
100 0 46 — 23 98  —  21
150 0 53 —  2 7 11 —  24
“The intervals used by various individuals and groups vary Throughout 
this article the algorithmic interval is taken to be from 0 1 W 1/ 3 ms to 
0 5 W l!z ms after the beginning of the explosion, where W  is the yield of 
the explosion m kilotons
A common misconception has been that the algorithmic interval lies within 
the strong shock region and that the relative insensitivity of yield estimates to 
the properties of the medium stems from this 49 This misconception apparently
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Fig 6 — Yield estimates derived by applying the Los Alamos Formula to SLIFEE 
data from a low-yield explosion in alluvium (note that the vertical axis is offset from 
zero) The data have been scaled so that the estimated yield should be 1 kt Difficulties 
in applying the insensitive interval algorithm to low-yield explosions in alluvium are not 
uncommon
has arisen at least in part because the interval formerly used to estimate the 
yields of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere using hydrodynamic methods m 
within the strong shock region As explained earlier, the relative insensitivity of 
the radius of the shock front to the medium m the algorithmic interval would be 
explained if the algorithmic interval were within the strong shock region and if 
the motion were self-similar The formula for the radius of the shock front would 
then be a power-law function of time hke the Los Alamos Formula, except that 
the exponent of t would be 0 4 However, in reality the shock wave motion is not 
self-similar during the algorithmic interval, for current test geometries and the 
yields permitted by the TTBT In fact, the shock wave is not even strong during 
this interval, since the shock speed is only a few times the low-pressure plastic 
wave speed while the peak pressure is much less than the pressure required to 
achieve the hunting density ratio Indeed, the exponent of time usually used m 
the Los Alamos Formula, 0 475, is significantly greater than the exponent 0 4 
characteristic of a strong, self-similar shock wave The power-law Los Alamos 
Formula is not a theoretical result hke the power-law formula for the radius of a 
strong, self similar shock wave Rather, it is an approximate, empirical relation, 
which was obtained by fitting a simple power law expression to a selected interval 
of RVT data from a collection of nuclear explosions m several different media
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B Similar Explosion Scaling
As long as the final state of the shocked rock is independent of the rate 
of compression and explosions take place in the same medium, the RVT curve 
depends only on the yield of the explosion 11 If R =  f ( t)  is the RVT curve for 
an explosion with a yield of 1 kt, then the curve for a yield of W  kt is
R =  W ^ fi t/ W ^ 3) (17)
The model given by equation (11), for example, scales with yield in this way 
Thus, if the shock wave motion is measured for a given explosion of unknown 
yield that takes place in the same medium as a previous explosion, and if both 
RVT data and the yield are available for the previous explosion, the yield of the 
given explosion can be estimated by comparing the two sets of RVT data This 
algorithm is called similar explosion scaling
Similar explosion scaling can utihze data outside the insensitive interval and 
works well if the ambient media at the two explosion sites are sufficiently similar 
However, in practice it has sometimes proved difficult to ascertain whether the 
relevant properties of the media are similar enough to give the desired accuracy 
As a result, apphcation of this algorithm has sometimes led to unexpected errors 
m the estimated yield
If hydrodynamic yield estimation is adopted for TTBT verification, similar 
explosion scaling would presumably be used where possible to check the results 
of insensitive interval scaling
C Semi-Analytical Modeling
Another approach that is useful for studying the evolution of shock waves in 
geologic media and for estimating yields is semi-analytical modehng 30 32 50-52 
In this approach both the properties of the ambient medium and the motion of 
the shock front are treated m a simplified way that nevertheless includes the most 
important effects The result is a relatively simple, semi-analytical expression 
for the radius of the shock front as a function of time If the required properties 
of the ambient medium are known and inserted m this expression, the yield of 
an explosion can be estimated by fitting the expression to RVT data
Semi-analytical algorithms can make use of data over a more extensive 
interval than the interval used in the insensitive interval algorithm For example, 
apphcation of equation (10) to particle velocity data taken 8 m from an explosion 
with a nominal yield of 10 4kt gave an estimated yield of 10 3 kt 53 Even data 
taken at a radius of 13 5 m, well outside the algorithmic interval, gave a yield of 
7 9 kt Semi-analytical models can also be used to estimate the uncertainty in 
the yield caused by uncertainties in the properties of the ambient medium
D Numerical Modeling
If a treatment that includes the details of the equation of state and other 
properties of the ambient medium is required, if it is desired to utihze RVT
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data in the region where the shock wave has spht, or if the explosion is not 
spherically symmetric, modehng of the motion of the shock front using numerical 
codes may be necessary 54 In principle, such simulations can provide RVT curves 
that extend over much of the shock wave evolution, making it possible to base 
yield estimates not only on data from the transition interval but also on data 
from later phases of the shock wave evolution In these later phases, the shock 
wave is no longer hydrodynamic, so yield estimation methods that make use 
of such data are not hydrodynamic methods Yield estimates made using data 
from later phases are fairly sensitive to the equation of state and constitutive 
relations that characterize the ambient rock Since these are accurately known 
only for a few rocks, accurate yield estimates are possible using late-time data 
only for explosions in a few geologic media
E Complications
In order to use hydrodynamic methods, RVT data must be taken within 
meters of the center of the explosion (cf Tables 2 and 3) At such small distances, 
the arrangement of the nuclear charge and the canister or canisters containing 
it and the diagnostic equipment can introduce asymmetries in the expansion of 
the shock wave that will affect the yield estimate
• A long canister can produce a shock wave that is initially cylindrical and 
hence crushes the sensing cable in such a way that only part of the total 
yield is sensed over most of the interval sampled, as shown schematically in 
Figure 7a The physical size of canisters and diagnostic hnes-of-sight tend 
to pose more of a problem for tests of nuclear directed-energy weapons than 
for tests of traditional nuclear weapons 55
• Explosions of nuclear charges m tunnels may be accompanied by compli­
cated (and unanticipated) energy flows and complex shock wave patterns 
If significant energy reaches the sensing cable ahead of the ground shock 
and shorts or destroys it before the ground shock arrives, the CORRTEX 
data will describe that flow of energy and not the motion of the ground 
shock Moreover, the ground shock itself may become sufficiently distorted 
that the RVT data are confusing or misleading
In complicated geometries, disturbing effects hke these are difficult to analyze 
and correct for using data from a single sensing cable, since it senses only the 
depth of the shallowest point where a pressure wave first crushes it, at a single 
azimuth and lateral displacement from the explosion As a result, unambiguous 
interpretation of the data may become difficult or impossible The disturbing 
effect of a canister and emplacement hole of given size is less for higher-yield 
than for lower-yield explosions, since the hydrodynamic region extends further 
from the canister and emplacement hole for a higher yield explosion In addition, 
higher-yield charges are not usually exploded in tunnels
In addition to the potential disturbing effects of the nuclear test design, 
any errors in characterizing the surrounding geologic media will introduce errors
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Fig 7 — Schematic drawings illustrating disturbance of hydrodynamic yield esti­
mates by (a) a nuclear test design that produces a cylindrical shock wave during the 
algorithmic interval and (b) slowing and weakening of the upward traveling portion of 
the shock wave when it encounters a much denser geologic stratum
in yield estimates derived using hydrodynamic methods Incorrect assumptions 
about the average properties of the rock surrounding the emplacement hole may 
bias the yield estimate, decreasing its accuracy, while small-scale variations in 
the rock will cause scatter in the RVT record, decreasing the precision of the yield 
estimate In addition, geologic structures like that shown m Figure 7b can affect 
the yield estimate At the Nevada Test Site, for example, the alluvial deposits are 
weakly consolidated erosion products of the suroundmg mountains with physical 
properties that vary widely Layers of gravel, the residues of ancient stream 
beds, are often encountered m drilled holes While most RVT records follow 
the expected behavior, an occasionai event will produce an RVT record whose 
irregular behavior defies simple explanation Such behavior has been attributed 
to spatial variations m the ambient medium 26
F Summary of Yield Estimation
Shock waves produced by an underground nuclear explosion propagate dif­
ferently in different media and different geologic structures As a result, knowl­
edge of the rock and geologic structure within ~10 ( W / l  kt)1/ 3 meters of the 
center of the explosion is required m order to make accurate yield estimates 
using hydrodynamic methods The evolution of the shock wave can also be af-
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fected by the test geometry Knowledge of the test geometry and/or limitations 
on the aspects that could disturb the RVT data are therefore required in order 
to make accurate yield estimates Several diiferent yield estimation algorithms 
have been developed Like the algorithms used to estimate yields from seismic 
data, these algorithms involve some complexity and require sophistication to 
understand and apply correctly
Hydrodynamic yield estimation methods have not yet been studied as thor­
oughly or as widely as seismic methods Although approximately 100 tests have 
been earned out with the CORRTEX sensing cable in the emplacement hole, 
only a few have been carried out with the cable m a satellite hole5 6 (in addition, 
SLIFER data from sensing cables m satellite holes are available for several tens 
of earlier explosions) Moreover, no systematic and comprehensive review of the 
scientific evidence concerning the accuracy and precision of U S hydrodynamic 
yield estimation methods has yet been earned out The U S Department of 
State has asserted that the methods are accurate to within 15% (at the 95% 
confidence level) of radiochemical yield estimates for tests with yields greater 
than 50 kt m the geologic media m which tests have been conducted at the 
Nevada Test Site 5 6 According to these same reports, the algonthm is expected 
to have an uncertainty of a factor of 1 3 at the 95% confidence level if used m a 
treaty-momtonng context at the Soviet test sites near Shagan River to monitor 
explosions with yields greater than 50 kt 5 6 However, some scientists familiar 
with the methods beheve that the uncertainty could be somewhat larger 4
Some key terms that have been introduced in this discussion are hsted and 
explained in Table 4
VI APPLICATION TO MONITORING TEST BAN TREATIES
A Assuring Accuracy
Ambient medium — As explained in §111 and §V, the physical properties and 
geologic structure of the media around the emplacement point affect the evolu­
tion of the shock wave produced by an underground nuclear explosion Thus, 
it is important m test ban monitoring to gather information about the types 
of rock present at the test site and their properties, including their chemical 
composition, bulk density, porosity, gas-filled porosity, and degree of liquid sat­
uration, as well as the speed of sound m the rock and any specific features of 
the local geologic structure that could affect the yield estimate Such data are 
easily gathered by the party conducting the explosion Availability of the re­
quired data to the momtonng party could be assured by appropriate negotiated 
cooperative measures
Some information about the geologic medium at the test site can be ob­
tained by examining the contents of the hole drilled for the CORRTEX sensing 
cable Verification could be improved by cooperative arrangements that would 
also allow observation of the construction of the emplacement hole, removal and 
examination of rock core or rock fragments from the wall of the emplacement
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TABLE 4
Glossary of Hydrodynamic Yield Estimation Terms
Term Explanation
Algorithmic interval The interval, m time usually 0 1-0 5 scaled ms 
after the beginning of the explosion, from which 
data is selected in applymg insensitve interval 
scaling
CORRTEX technique A technique for measuring the position of the 
shock front expanding away from an underground 
explosion by determining the round-trip travel 
time of electrical pulses sent down a sensing cable 
placed in a hole in the ground near the explosion
Insensitive interval scaling A yield estimation algorithm m which the Los 
Alamos Formula is fit to measurements of the 
position of the expanding shock front as a function 
of time during the algorithmic interval
Los Alamos Formula The empirical formula used m insensitive interval 
scaling to make yield estimates by fitting to shock 
front radius vs time data
Plastic wave interval The interval in radius and time in which the speed 
of the weakening hydrodynamic shock wave is less 
than 1 2 times the low-pressure plastic wave speed
Similar explosion scaling A yield estimation algorithm in which shock front 
radius data are compared with similar data from 
a previous explosion in the same medium
SLIFER technique A technique for measuring the position of the 
shock front expanding away from an underground 
explosion by determining the resonant frequency 
of an electrical circuit that mcludes a sensing 
cable placed m a hole in the ground near the 
explosion
Strong shock interval The interval m radius and time in which the 
density just behind the shock front is close to its 
limiting value
Transition interval The interval in radius and time m which the 
density just behind the shock front is less than 
80% of its limiting value but the speed of the 
hydrodynamic shock wave is still greater than 1 2 
times the low-pressure plastic wave speed
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hole, examination of any logs or drill core from existing exploratory holes, re­
moval and examination of rock core or rock fragments from the walls of existing 
exploratory holes, and if necessary, construction of new exploratory holes
There is precedent for such cooperative arrangements in the Protocol to the 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), which explicitly estabhshed that 
hydrodynamic methods could be used to monitor the yield of any explosion with 
a planned aggregate yield greater than 150 kt and which specified verification 
measures hke those described here 3
Test geometry — As explained m §V, the arrangement of the nuclear charge 
and the canister or canisters containing it and the diagnostic eqmpment can 
introduce asymmetries in the expansion of the shock wave which disturb the 
yield estimate In using hydrodynamic methods to estimate the yields of one’s 
own tests, the design and placement of the nuclear charge and related eqmpment 
axe known and can be taken into account This information may not be available 
when monitoring the nuclear tests of another party Cooperative agreements 
to ensure satisfactory placement of the sensing cable and to exclude nuclear 
test geometries that would significantly disturb the yield estimate are therefore 
required 55-58
Such agreements could, for example, limit the length of the canister contain­
ing the nuclear charge and the cross-sectional dimensions of the emplacement 
hole, and mandate stemming of the emplacement hole with certain types of ma­
terials Such agreements could also provide for observation of the emplacement 
of the nuclear charge and the backfilling of the emplacment hole, confirmation 
of the depth of emplacement, and limitations on the placement of cables or 
other eqmpment that might interfere with the CORRTEX measurement For 
test geometries that include ancillary shafts, drifts, or other cavities, additional 
measures, such as placement of several sensmg cables around the nuclear charge 
emplacement point, may be required to assure an accurate yield estimate For 
tunnel shots, sensmg cables could be placed in the tunnel walls or m a special 
hole drilled toward the tunnel from above Again, there is precedent for such 
cooperative measures in the PNET 3
The restrictions on the size of canisters and diagnostic hnes-of-sight that 
would be required even with the sensmg cable placed in a satellite hole would 
cause some interference with the U S nuclear testing program at NTS However, 
these restrictions have been examined in detail by the U S nuclear weapon 
design laboratories and the Department of Energy, and have been found to be 
manageable for the weapon tests that are planned for the next several years 55 58 
For the more distant future, the disadvantages of the reqmred restrictions on 
testing must be weighed against the potential contributions to treaty monitoring 
that could be made by hydrodynamic methods
In summary, the accuracy that could be achieved using hydrodynamic meth­
ods to momtor test ban treaties depends on the amount of information about 
the ambient medium that can be gathered by the monitoring party and the na­
ture and extent of cooperative arrangements to limit disturbing effects Some
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tests and simulations to identify troublesome configurations have been earned 
out, but such configurations have not been thoroughly explored Given the pos­
sibility that hydrodynamic yield estimation methods may have to be used to 
momtor treaty compliance m an adversarial atmosphere, the possibility of de­
liberate efforts to introduce error or ambiguity, and the tendency for worst-case 
interpretations to prevail, additional research to improve understanding of the 
accuracy and precision of these methods and to reduce further the chances of 
confusion, ambiguity, spoofing, or data denial is very important
B Minimizing Intrusion
Hydrodynamic yield estimation methods are more intrusive than seismic 
methods for several reasons
• Drilling of the emplacement and satellite holes and emplacement of the 
nuclear charge and diagnostic equipment typically take 8-10 weeks In order 
to momtor these operations, personnel from the monitoring country would 
have to be present at the test site of the testing country for ten weeks or so 
before as well as during each test, and would therefore have an opportunity 
to observe test preparations The presence of these personnel would pose 
some operational security problems 55 58 59
• The exterior of the canister or canisters containing the nuclear charge and 
diagnostic eqmpment must be examined to verify that the restrictions nec­
essary for the yield estimate to be valid are satisfied For tests of nuclear 
directed-energy weapons, this examination could reveal sensitive design in­
formation unless special procedures are followed 58
• Sensing cables and electrical eqmpment will tend to pick up the electromag­
netic pulse (EMP) generated by the explosion A detailed analysis of the 
EMP would reveal sensitive information about the design and performance 
of the nuclear device being tested 60
Intrusiveness can be minimized by careful attention to monitoring procedures 
and eqmpment For example, the electrical recording eqmpment can be designed 
to avoid measuring sensitive information about the nuclear devices bemg tested 
CORRTEX eqmpment has been designed in this way, and the Umted States 
could insist that any Soviet eqmpment used at the Nevada Test Site be similarly 
designed Placement of the recording equipment in Faraday cages and other 
measures could be mandated m order to minimize the chance that sensitive 
information concerning the test could be picked up by the monitoring party 
The security problems posed by opportunities to observe test preparations 
are more severe for nuclear directed energy weapon tests, since they tend to 
have larger and more complex diagnostic systems and canister arrangements 
which, if fully revealed to the Soviets, might disclose sensitive information 55 58 
The Umted States has determined that the Soviet personnel and activities that 
would be reqmred at the Nevada Test Site to momtor U S tests would be 
acceptable both from a security standpoint and from the standpoint of their
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effect on the U S test program Detailed operational plans have been developed 
to accommodate such visits without adverse impact on operations 55
C Specific Applications
Threshold Test Ban Treaty — As noted earlier, hydrodynamic yield estima­
tion methods have been proposed by the Reagan administration as a new routine 
measure for monitoring the sizes of nuclear tests, in order to verify compliance 
with the 150 kt limit of the TTBT These methods can be used only if appro­
priate changes m the TTBT are negotiated In addition, adequate cooperative 
arrangements would need to be made m order to assure the accuracy of the 
resulting yield estimates To reduce the cost and intrusiveness of verification, 
use of hydrodynamic methods could be restricted to tests with planned yields 
greater than some threshold that is an appreciable fraction of 150 kt As an al­
ternative to routine use, hydrodynamic methods could be used to help calibrate 
seismic yield estimation methods by measuring the yields of one or more nuclear 
calibration explosions at test sites,57 61 provided that the medium in which the 
explosion takes place is within U S test experience and the necessary procedures 
are followed to assure the accuracy of the hydrdodynamic yield estimate
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty — As it stands, the PNET does not pro­
vide for use of hydrodynamic yield estimation except for salvos in which the 
planned aggregate yield is greater than 150 kt 3 Thus, if the TTBT is modi­
fied to allow hydrodynamic yield estimation for all weapon tests with planned 
yields above a certain value, the purpose of the modification could in principle 
be circumvented by carrying out weapon tests as “peaceful” nuclear explosions 
of “planned yield” less than or equal to 150 kt, unless the PNET is also modified 
to close this loophole
Low Threshold Test Ban Treaty — Tamped underground nuclear explosions 
as small as a few kilotons produce shock waves that evolve m the same way as 
those produced by explosions of larger yield However, because the algorithmic 
interval for such explosions is much closer to the nuclear charge and diagnos­
tic canisters than the algorithmic interval for tests with much larger yields, the 
disturbing effect of the canisters is generally more serious for such explosions 
Moreover, low yield tests can be and often are set off at shallow depths in softer 
material, such as alluvium, or m tunnels As a result, the propagation of the 
shock wave can differ markedly from the models on which standard hydrody­
namic yield estimation methods are based, causmg confusion or error in the 
yield estimate There can also be significant variations in the motion of the 
shock wave from explosion to explosion under these conditions
In addition, serious practical, operational, and engineering problems anse 
m trying to use hydrodynamic methods to estimate the yields of explosions with 
yields of a few kilotons For one thing, the sensing cable must be placed very close 
to the nuclear charge Dnlhng a satellite hole within 2-5 meters of the emplace­
ment hole to the depth at which the nuclear charge is placed (typically ~250 m 
even for low-yield explosions in vertical shafts), which would be required in order
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to use hydrodynamic methods to monitor explosions with yields m the 1-10 kt 
range, is at or beyond the capabilities of current drilling techniques 41 The need 
for such close placement would also necessitate more stringent restrictions on 
the maximum sizes and orientations of the nuclear charge and the diagnostic 
canisters Such restrictions might be deemed an unacceptable interference with 
test programs The alternative of using small canisters with numerous diag­
nostic hnes-of-sight to the detonation point could disturb the shock wave and 
introduce errors m the yield measurements Finally, because the shock wave 
radii to be measured are much smaller at low yields, survey errors become much 
more important
It is possible that some of these difficulties could be circumvented by de­
veloping models and algorithms that would allow routine use of RVT data at 
radn beyond the hydrodynamic interval, as discussed in §V Others could be al­
leviated by conducting tests with simple geometries to define and calibrate test 
sites so that insensitive interval scaling could be accurately apphed However, 
these and other potential solutions to the problems that would be encountered 
in monitoring low-yield tests using hydrodynamic methods have not yet been 
carefully and thoroughly studied Thus, at the present time hydrodynamic yield 
estimation methods could not be used with confidence to momtor compliance 
with threshold test bans m which the threshold is less than several tens of kilo- 
tons
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty — Hydrodynamic methods can only be used 
with shock wave data taken within meters of the center of the explosion More­
over, their use reqmres advance notification of tests, extensive preparations in 
advance at the test site, and the presence of monitoring personnel during the 
test Hydrodynamic methods were not intended and clearly are not able to de­
tect or identify unannounced, remote, or clandestine nuclear tests As a result, 
they cannot contribute to monitoring a comprehensive test ban
v n  DISCUSSION
Hydrodynamic methods could be a potentially valuable component of a 
cooperative program to improve monitoring of the TTBT and PNET Hydrody­
namic yield estimates are more affected than seismic estimates by local features 
that disturb the evolution of the shock wave, such as canisters or local geologic 
structures For explosions larger than ~10 kt, seismic yield estimates are less 
affected by local features but are affected by how the shock wave evolves into 
seismic waves Thus, yield estimates based on hydrodynamic methods would 
complement yield estimates based on seismic methods
Apparently, a systematic and comprehensive review of the scientific evi­
dence concerning the accuracy and precision of hydrodynamic yield estimation 
methods has not yet been conducted in the Umted States Nor has the United 
States any experience as yet m applying these methods at Soviet test sites As 
noted in §V, the U S Department of State has asserted that yield estimates 
based on CORRTEX data analyzed using the insensitive interval algorithm are
139
expected to have an uncertainty of a factor of 1 3 at the 95% confidence level, 
for explosions larger than 50 kt at the Soviet test sites near Shagan River If 
achieved, such an uncertainty would be shghtly smaller than the uncertainty of 
a factor of 1 5-1 6 that according to recent studies4 could probably be Achieved 
using the best current seismic methods, if the test site is not calibrated and 
measurements are made only outside the Soviet Umon
Hydrodynamic methods could also be used to help calibrate seismic meth­
ods According to the results of a recent study, apphcation of the best current 
seismic methods to measurements made outside the Soviet Umon is expected 
give yield estimates that have an uncertainty of a factor of 1 3 at the 95% confi­
dence level, the same precision reportedly expected for hydrodynamic methods, 
once the Soviet test site is properly defined and calibrated 4
In its first years, the Reagan administration declined to resume the U S - 
Soviet negotiations on a CTBT that had been adjourned m 1980 However, in 
the summer of 1986 both parties agreed to begin new, low level talks on nuclear 
testing 60 62 The Soviet Umon reportedly pressed for resumption of negotiations 
on a CTBT and emphasized seismic verification methods whereas the United 
States sought an agreement allowing use of hydrodynamic methods as an addi­
tional verification measure for the TTBT and PNET 62 Then, in April 1987, the 
Soviet Umon suggested experiments at the U S and Soviet test sites as a way to 
advance the negotiations and to compare verification methods 63-65 As a result 
of further discussions66 67 the Umted States and the Soviet Umon announced 
on September 17, 1987, that they had agreed to renew full-scale negotiations on 
nuclear testing limitations 68 69 Formal negotiations began m November 1987 in 
Geneva
The parties agreed as a first step to negotiate verification measures for the 
TTBT and PNET In these negotiations, the sides agreed to make no changes 
m the treaties themselves but to negotiate a new protocol to each treaty, which 
would specify verification provisions 69 Once these two treaties have been rat­
ified, the parties have agreed to begin negotiations on ways to implement a 
step-by-step program to further limit nuclear tests 69
At the Washington Summit m December 1987, President Reagan and Gen­
eral Secretary Gorbachev agreed to conduct a joint verification experiment (JVE) 
at each other’s nuclear test sites 69 In this experiment, one nuclear charge with 
a yield near the 150 kt limit will be exploded at the Nevada Test Site, another 
will be exploded at the Soviet test site near Semipalatinsk The purpose of the 
experiment is to compare the verification techniques advocated by the two sides 
in the Geneva negotiations
In preparation for the JVE, 20 nuclear testing experts from each side visited 
the other side’s nuclear testing site in January 1988 to familiarize themselves 
with how each side conducts tests and to provide a basis for the design and 
conduct of the JVE 69 70 The second round of the current U S -Soviet test ban 
negotiations began in February 1988, and remained m continuous session until 
June 30, 1988 47 In March, drilling of the necessary holes began 69
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An agreement on the conduct of the JVE was signed on May 31, 1988, 
as part of the Moscow Summit 71 The agreement, which with its annex totals 
105 single-spaced pages, specifies that each party will have the opportunity to 
estimate the yield of each of the JVE explosions using both hydrodynamic meth­
ods (with sensing cables m both the emplacement hole and a satellite hole) and 
teleseismic methods (using recordings made at five designated seismic stations of 
each side) 69 71 Each party will also have the opportunity to make yield estimates 
using its national seismic network To assist the teleseismic measurements, on 
June 28, 1988, each side shared with the other data on five of its high-yield 
underground tests conducted after January 1, 1978, but before January 1, 1988, 
recorded at its five designated seismic stations located at teleseismic distances 
from its nuclear test site Associated geological and geophysical information and 
estimates of the yields of the five events were also exchanged 69
Originally, the Soviet Umon had suggested that each side furnish the nu­
clear charge to be exploded at the other side’s test site, so that the monitoring 
side would be able to compare the yields estimated using both seismic and hy­
drodynamic methods with a yield estimate based on knowledge of the design of 
the nuclear charge 64 ~66 However, the JVE is actually being earned out with 
a U S nuclear charge at the U S test site and a Soviet nuclear charge at the 
Soviet test site 71 As a result, the monitoring party will not have available an 
estimate of the yield of the explosion that is independent of both seismic and hy­
drodynamic methods In order to solve this calibration problem, the sides have 
agreed to accept the hydrodynamic yield estimate denved from the data taken 
with the sensing cable in the emplacement hole as the yield of the explosion for 
the purposes of the expenment
The JVE test at the Nevada Test Site, code-named Kearsarge, was com­
pleted as scheduled on August 17, 1988 The Soviet Umon reportedly gathered 
hydrodynamic data on the explosion using sensing cables m the emplacement 
and satellite holes, regional seismic data from the seismic stations that have been 
installed nearby as part of the NRDC Soviet Academy cooperative verification 
project,72 73 and teleseismic data from its own national seismic network 46 72 
The Soviets will also be able to use data from a variety of seismographic sta­
tions in the Umted States that routinely pubhsh such data The Umted States 
reportedly gathered hydrodynamic data on Kearsarge and will also be able to 
use data from its national seismic network as well as pubhshed data Data on 
this explosion were exchanged m Geneva on August 30, 1988, at the start of the 
third session of the current round of negotiations
According to press reports following Kearsarge,74 the nuclear charge was 
expected to have a yield of about 140 kt However, one U S hydrodynamic 
measurement reportedly gave a yield estimate shghtly more than 150 kt while 
the other gave a yield estimate shghtly more than 160 kt In contrast, data from 
the U S seismic network reportedly confirmed expectations that the yield of 
the explosion would be about 140 kt If the yield of the explosion was 140 kt 
and if the uncertainty of the hydrodynamic yield estimation algorithm used by
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the United States is a factor of 1 15 at the 95% confidence level at the Nevada 
Test Site, as asserted by the U S Department of State,5 6 then the probability 
that a single yield estimate would be larger than 160 kt is only about one in 40, 
while the joint probabihty that one yield estimate would be more than 150 kt 
and the other more than 160 kt is about one m 300 As a result of this outcome, 
the U S Department of Energy has reportedly decided to make a radiochemical 
yield estimate in order to better assess the yield of Kearsarge
As this is being written, preparations for the explosion at the Semipalatinsk 
Test Site, which is currently scheduled for September 14, 1988, are m progress 
Because of its strong advocacy of hydrodynamic methods, the Umted States 
has chosen not to gather regional seismic data on this explosion but will gather 
hydrodynamic data using CORRTEX sensing cables in the emplacment and 
satellite holes 75 The Umted States will also have available teleseismic data from 
its national seismic network Regional seismic data on the test at Semipalatinsk 
may be recorded by seismic stations that have been installed nearby as part of 
the NRDC-Soviet Academy cooperative verification project If they are, these 
data would presumably also be available to the U S government Thus, the 
JVE will provide the Umted States with a variety of information with which to 
improve its seismic estimates of the yields of past as well as future nuclear tests 
at Semipalatinsk
The U S dnve to negotiate hydrodynamic monitoring of the TTBT and 
PNET raises several important issues concerning the interaction of technology 
and pubhc pohcy From a purely scientific point of view, gathering of addi­
tional data on U S and Soviet test yields and achievement of better precision 
in estimatmg yields are advances However, the principal purpose of TTBT and 
PNET monitoring is presumably to increase the security of the Umted States 
and the Soviet Umon, rather than to advance scientific studies
From a security perspective, the purpose of requiring a precision of a factor 
of 1 3 at the 95% confidence level for monitoring the 150 kt limit of the TTBT 
appears unclear Such a precision means that there is only one chance in four 
that a smgle explosion with a yield of 164 kt would appear to be in compliance 
with the TTBT The administration has not explained why such a high precision 
is needed, nor has it explained why current seismic methods, which according to 
recent studies could achieve a similar precision using measurements made only 
outside the Soviet Umon, are still considered inadequate Was the requirement 
for such high precision estabhshed after a careful review of the purposes of 
the TTBT and PNET and the costs and benefits of requiring various levels of 
precision7 Or was it adopted simply because it was the highest precision that 
was thought to be achievable with hydrodynamic methods at the time the pohcy 
advocating such methods was adopted7
In assessing whether this degree of precision is necesssary, one must bear 
in mind the fact that if tests producing yields of 150 kt are performed, then 
approximately half of unbiased yield estimates will be above 150 kt (just as 
approximately half will be below 150kt), no matter how precise the estimates
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Moreover, both parties to the TTBT recognized at the time it was signed that 
the yield of a nuclear test cannot always be predicted accurately in advance, 
so that even if the planned yield is 150 kt, some variation from this value may 
occur 3
Whatever the justification for requiring a precision of a factor of 1 3 at the 
95% confidence level m monitoring the 150 kt limits of the TTBT and PNET, the 
considerations that enter an assessment of the precision that would be optimal in 
monitoring possible future lower-threshold test ban agreements are different, and 
depend on the threshold chosen For some choices of threshold, an uncertainty 
much greater than a factor of 1 3 might be adequate However, the emphasis 
on achieving a precision of a factor of 1 3 at 150 kt could estabhsh this precision 
in the pubhc mind as a requirement that must also be met m monitoring any 
future limitations on nuclear testing Such a development could impede progress 
toward achieving such limitations
Similarly, the emphasis on hydrodynamic monitoring of the TTBT and 
PNET might also estabhsh this verification technology as a required part of 
any low-threshold test ban agreement Given the difficulties that would have 
to be overcome to apply these methods with confidence to monitoring low yield 
tests, such a requirement could become an additional impediment to achieving 
a low threshold test ban
The current test ban negotiations and the Joint Verification Experiment 
have led to increased openness about the U S and Soviet nuclear testing pro­
grams and increased cooperation between the national security establishments 
of the Umted States and the Soviet Umon According to participants, both sides 
have approached the JVE as a useful joint venture, m which it has been possible 
to make enquiries, receive answers, and resolve concerns 69 In addition to these 
benefits, the JVE will also provide useful data on the seismic properties of the 
U S and Soviet test sites that may help both parties to resolve past concerns 
over compliance and to advance toward ratification of the TTBT and PNET
VIII CONCLUSIONS
Hydrodynamic methods were developed primarily as a tool to estimate the 
sizes of explosions in the U S and Soviet nuclear test programs and are in­
herently more intrusive than seismic methods From a scientific point of view 
hydrodynamic methods are no more “direct” than seismic methods Nor are 
hydrodynamic methods necessarily free of systematic error The use of hydro 
dynamic methods at Soviet test sites would give estimates of the yields of Soviet 
tests larger than 50 kt that are shghtly more precise than could be achieved using 
the best currently available seismic methods, if (1) the cooperative arrangements 
needed to assure the accuracy of hydrodynamic methods are successfully nego­
tiated and followed, (2) U S hydrodynamic methods applied at Soviet test sites 
prove to be as precise as expected by the U S Department of State, (3) the So­
viet test sites are not calibrated for seismic measurements, and (4) seismic data 
are collected only outside the Soviet Umon On the other hand, the precision of
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the best available remote seismic methods is expected to be comparable to the 
precision that could be achieved using hydrodynamic methods if the Soviet test 
sites are appropriately defined and calibrated Significant engineering, opera­
tional, and analysis problems need to be solved before hydrodynamic methods 
could be used to monitor with confidence a low-threshold test ban The methods 
are not relevant to a comprehensive test ban
Possible advantages of an agreement allowing use of hydrodynamic yield 
estimation methods for monitoring the TTBT and PNET include the increased 
openness about nuclear testing programs to which this would lead and the on­
going cooperation between the national security establishments of the Umted 
States and the Soviet Umon that would occur, as well as the additional deter­
rence against cheating and the additional assurance of compliance that use of 
these methods would provide Such an agreement would also estabhsh the princi­
ple of on-site inspection at nuclear test sites, would make available more accurate 
data on the yield distribution of large nuclear tests, and might indirectly lim it 
nuclear testing m the future
Possible disadvantages of seeking an agreement allowing routine use of hy­
drodynamic methods for test ban momtonng include the potential difficulty of 
successfully negotiating such use, the restrictions that such use would impose 
on nuclear test designs, which could adversely affect nuclear testing programs 
in the future, and the operational security problems at test sites that would be 
created by the continuous presence there of dozens of momtonng personnel from 
the other country Adoption of hydrodynamic yield estimation methods for rou­
tine test ban momtonng might also create an impediment to further progress 
in limiting nuclear testing Many of the possible advantages of hydrodynamic 
methods could be gamed and many of the possible disadavantages of routine 
use avoided by an agreement allowing limited use of such methods, such as for 
calibration of seismic methods
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